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I. INTRODUCTION
When President Barack Obama nominated Service Employees
International Union (³SEIU´) Associate General Counsel Craig Becker to
serve on the National Labor Relations Board (³NLRB´Rr ³Board´), some
commentators argued that he would impose a controversial method of
recognizing unions, known as card-check or majority sign-up, through the
administrative process.1 This method of recognizing unions was stalled in
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, American University, Washington College of Law;
M.A. Candidate, International Development, December 2011, American University,
School of International Service. A special thanks to Gwen and Bill Nutting for
supporting my education over the years.
1.
See Editorial, Back Door Card Check, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2010, at A20,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703597204575483882585485368.htm
l (last visited Nov. 10, 2010) (suggesting Becker will push the NLRB to implement the
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Congress in the Employee Free Choice Act (³EFCA´).2 The current Board
practice, in general LV WR UHFRJQL]H DQ HPSOR\HU¶V FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ
obligation only if the union has won an NLRB-certified secret ballot
election.3 Although the Supreme Court has affirmed this interpretation of
the National Labor Relations Act (³NLRA´ RU ³$FW´),4 the Board retains
the discretion to change its interpretation under the Chevron doctrine.5
The NLRB could expand the methods by which a union may be
recognized as the representative of a bargaining unit with approval by a
majority of employees.6 It would be welOZLWKLQWKHVFRSHRIWKH%RDUG¶V
power to impose this change using its adjudication process, although it is
unlikely that the Board will move in this direction.7 Additionally, the nature
of the Board is such that its membership undergoes a complete turnover
during the course of a presidential term, and thus there is no guarantee that
the new rule would remain on the books for long.
Currently, the Employee Free Choice Act is pending in Congress, but its
FDUGFKHFNVLQFHWKH()&$IDLOHGWRSDVVLQ&RQJUHVV 5\DQ2¶'RQQHOOCraig Becker:
%LJ /DERU¶V %LJ $OO\, THE FOUNDRY (Mar. 26, 2010, 2:00 PM),
http://blog.heritage.org/2010/03/26/craig-becker-big-labor%E2%80%99s-big-ally/ (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (denouncing recess appointment of Becker because his past
reflects a bias against employers and support for the card check); Brad Peck, Craig
Becker±&DUG &KHFN¶V ,QVLGH 0DQ, THE CHAMBER POST (Jul. 25, 2009, 8:48 AM),
http://www.chamberpost.com/2009/07/craig-becker-card-checks-inside-man.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (seeking further scrutiny RI%HFNHU¶VSURXQLRQSDVWEHFDXVHLW
may lead Becker to eliminate the secret ballot through a position on the NLRB).
2.
See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (providing an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c) (2006), to enable the Board to designate a labor organization as the exclusive
EDUJDLQLQJ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RQ WKH SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI ³YDOLG DXWKRUL]Dtions designating the
individual or labor organization specified in the petition as their bargaining
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ 
3.
See Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 310 (1974)
(holding, absent evidence of unfair labor practices on the part of an employer, a union
in possession of authorization cards must commence to an NLRB-certified election).
4.
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151±69 (2006).
5.
See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398±99, 402±03 (1996)
(apSO\LQJ GHIHUHQFH WR 1/5%¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI VHFRQGDU\ IDUPLQJ DQG IRFXVLQJ RQ
the reasonableness of the interpretation given the ambiguity of the statutory language
(citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)));
see generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)
GHFODULQJ WKDW DQ DJHQF\¶V UHDVRQDEOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI D VWDWXWH VKRXOG EH JLYHQ
GHIHUHQFHZKHUH&RQJUHVV¶VLQWHQWLVQRWIUHHIURPDPELJXLW\ 
6.
See Mark Schoeff Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a Reality,
MGMT.
(Jul.
2009),
available
at
WORKFORCE
http://www.workforce.com/section/03/feature/26/5/2/97/265299_printer.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (observing, as former NLRB Chairman William Gould, IV
stated, that the NLRB frequently reverses its interpretation of labor law).
7.
See id. (noting that the NLRB has other methods of ordering union recognition
through card-check short of reversing long-standing Board precedent).
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future is uncertain at best.8 This legislation would provide card-check
recognition during union organization campaigns, rather than allowing
employers to demand a NLRB-certified secret-ballot election.9 The
measure is supported by labor because it will increase union membership.10
However, those who oppose this legislation cite its undemocratic nature
and the possibility that unions may use coercion to obtain signed cards.11
President Obama came under fire for ignoring labor issues during his
first year in office and his inability to navigate around Republican efforts to
block new labor legislation.12 A policy shift within the NLRB itself may be
RQHRIODERU¶VEHVWKRSHVIRURUJDQL]HGODERUUHIRUPVLQFHWKHEDODQFHRI
WKH%RDUG¶VPHPEHUVKLSLVLGHRORJLFDOO\SUR-labor.13 The controversy over
the EFCA makes it unlikely for the Board to wait for a statutory
amendment to implement card-check method.14
This Article will examine whether the NLRB has the power to make the
card-check method law through the administrative process. Part II explains
and defines card-check recognition.15 Part III discusses the statutory
8.
See Daniel Malloy, Labor-Business Class Shifts from Congress, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Jan.
17,
2011,
A-1,
available
at
http://www.postgazette.com/pg/11017/1118574-84.stm (observing, given backers of the EFCA were
XQDEOHWRREWDLQVL[W\YRWHVLQWKH6HQDWHWKHFXUUHQWGLYLGHG&RQJUHVVUHQGHUV³OLWWOH
FKDQFHRI()&$¶VUHVXVFLWDWLRQ´ 
9.
See Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009); Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (mandating, upon passage, the NLRB to determine the substance and procedure
of adjudicating authorization card validity).
10. See Sam Hananel, ABC NEWS, Organized LDERU¶V $JHQGD +LWV 5RDGEORFN
What Now? (Feb. 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=9963922
ODVW YLVLWHG 1RY    GLVFXVVLQJ WKH ODERU PRYHPHQW¶V IUXVWUDWLRQ ZLWK LWV
inability to get its goals through the Democratic-controlled Congress).
11. See /HWWHUIURP5%UXFH-RVWHQ([HF9LFH3UHVLGHQW*RY¶W$IIDLUV&KDPEHU
of Commerce to S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions (Jul. 24, 2009)
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/hillletters/090724_becker.pdf H[SUHVVLQJ FRQFHUQ WKDW %HFNHU¶V SUR-labor views incline
him to implement portions of EFCA absent congressional passage²most notably
SROLFLHVWKDWXWLOL]H³TXHVWLRQDEOHSUHVVXUHWDFWLFV>RQ@HPSOR\HUVDQGZRUNHUV´DQG
³WKHHIIHFWLYHHOLPLQDWLRQRIVHFUHWEDOORWVLQRUJDQL]LQJFDPSDLJQV´ 
12. See Hananel, supra note 10 (discussing the AFL-&,2¶V IUXVWUDWLRQ ZLWK
3UHVLGHQW2EDPD¶VSXVKIRUKHDOWKFDUHUHIRUPWRWDNHSUHFHGHQFHEHIRUH()&$GXULQJ
the first year of his administration).
13. See Melanie Trottman & Kris Maher, /DERU%RDUG¶V5HFHQW'HFLVLRQV7LOWLQ
Favor of Unions, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2010, at A5, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704804504575606872095817474.htm
l (last visited Nov. 22, 2010) (observing that Republican gains in Congress after the
November 2010 election effectively killed EFCA).
14. See id. (reviewing the Obama-HUD %RDUG¶V TXLFN UHYHUVDO RI VHYHUDO %XVK-era
NLRB decisions).
15. See infra Part II (defining card-check and its significance in relation to the
EFCA).
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framework for recognition of union representatives.16 Part IV provides a
historical overview of the development of the law surrounding the union
recognition process.17 Part V of this Article discusses whether and how the
administrative process could be used to make card-check the law despite
Congressional inaction.18 Additionally, Part V argues that although it is
possible under current administrative and labor law to do so, such a policy
would be short-lived.19 Part VI concludes that it in the best interest of
organized labor to pursue passage of the Employee Free Choice Act rather
than to encourage the NLRB to act on its own.20
II. WHAT IS THE CARD-CHECK METHOD?
Put simply, card-check is a way to document majority support for a
union through signed cards rather than going through a certification
election.21 Card-check is not an alien concept in American labor law,
because an employer may choose to recognize a union based on cards and
opt to never raise a challenge tR ZKHWKHU WKH XQLRQ¶V DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV
actually support the organizational will of employees.22 Once recognized,
the employer has many of the same legal obligations with respect to that
union as though the union had won certification after a secret ballot
election.23 If the employer refuses to recognize the union voluntarily, then
16. See infra Part III (indentifying and explaining Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(c) in
UHODWLRQWRDQHPSOR\HU¶VREOLJDWLRQWRFROOHFWLYHO\EDUJDLQXQGHUWKH1/5$ 
17. See infra 3DUW,9 WUDFLQJWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKH%RDUG¶VVKLIW from
accepting a card-check method to a secret ballot election).
18. See infra Part V.A (exploring the possibility that the Board could adopt cardcheck through adjudication under a Chevron two-step process).
19. See infra Part V.B (discussing the problems with and administrative
adjudication accepting card-check).
20. See infra Part VI (stating that an adoption through the EFCA is favored over an
adjudication by the Board due to the potential political costs and negative
implications).
21. See Hananel, supra note 10 (noting that opponents fear Becker may try to
impose a policy that subverts majority-rule election with majority-rule authorization
cards carte blanche²without Congressional endorsement for such a complete shift).
22. See Mark Schoeff, Jr., NLRB Decisions Could Make Card Check a Reality,
MGMT.,
Jul.
2009,
available
at
WORKFORCE
http://www.workforce.com/section/03/feature/26/5/2/97/265299_printer.html
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2010) (stating the policy regarding card-check authorization for union
representation is currently in the hands of the employer, who may request a NLRBsupervised and certified election prior to recognizing a union as the exclusive
bargaining representative for employees).
23. But cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 598±99 & n.14 (1969)
(allowing employers who have voluntarily recognized a union on the basis of
DXWKRUL]DWLRQFDUGVWRFDOOIRUDYRWHWRZLWKLQWZHOYHPRQWKVRIWKHXQLRQ¶VUHFRJQLWLRQ
to ascertain whether the union still retains a majority of employee support (citing
Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 75 (1954))).
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the question of representation must be resolved through a secret ballot
election, and the cards become moot.24 The card-check measure included in
the EFCA would make recognition mandatory if a majority of employees
pronounce their support of the union by signing cards.25 This Article
DQDO\]HVWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKH1/5%¶VDXWKRULW\WRUHTXLUHDQDXWRPDWLF
obligation to bargain through the use of card-check absent the statutory
amendments proposed in the EFCA.
III. THE STATUTORY BASIS OF AN EMPLOYER¶S OBLIGATION TO ENGAGE
IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
The NLRA contains two provisions that are key to the discussion at
hand: Sections 9(c) and 8(a)(5).26 Currently, under Section 9(c), whenever
D³TXHVWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´LVUDLVHGRQO\WKHFHUWLILHGUHVXOWVRIDVHFUHW
EDOORWHOHFWLRQDUHGHWHUPLQDWLYHRIDXQLRQ¶VVWDWXV27 The Board possesses
DUJXDEO\ ZLGH GLVFUHWLRQ WR LQWHUSUHW ³TXHVWLRQ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ XQGHU
Section 9(c)28 DQG ³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ XQGHU Section 8(a)(5).29 Hence, the
Board could potentially expand the applicability of card-check by adopting
DQDUURZGHILQLWLRQRIZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVD³TXHVWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´30
Sometimes a secret ballot election is impractical.31 Under Section
 D   DQ HPSOR\HU¶V IDLOXUH WR EDUJDLQ ZLWK WKH certified Section 9(a)
24. See Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union Representation
Elections and Federal Labor Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 495, 513±14 (1993) (observing
that employee signed authorization cards do not create a statutory duty to bargain with
DXQLRQRQWKHSDUWRIWKHHPSOR\HUDQGDQHPSOR\HU¶VUHIXVDOWREDUJDLQZLWKDXQLRQ
RQ WKH EDVLV RI WKH XQLRQ¶V DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV²in the absence of an NLRB secret
ballot election²is not an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of
the NLRA).
25. Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA) of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (1st Sess.
2009) (proposing an amendment to 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006) to require certification
ZKHQ³DPDMRULW\RIWKHHPSOR\HHVLn a unit appropriate for bargaining has signed valid
authorizations designating the individual or labor organization specified in the petition
DVWKHLUEDUJDLQLQJUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ 
26. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (making an
HPSOR\HU¶V³UHIXV>DO@WREDUJDLQFROOHFWLYHO\ZLWKWKHrepresentatives of his employees,
VXEMHFW WR > 86&  @´ DQ XQIDLU ODERU SUDFWLFH HPSKDVLV DGGHG   
(requiring the Board to investigate a petition presented by a union to the NLRB to
FHUWLI\ WKDW XQLRQ DV WKH FROOHFWLYH EDUJDLQLQJ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH IRU WKH HPSOR\HU¶V
HPSOR\HHV DQG ³LI >WKH %RDUG@ KDV UHDVRQDEOH FDXVH WR EHOLHYH WKDW D TXHVWLRQ RI
representation . . . exists [sic] shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice .
. . [and] if [the Board] finds that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct
an election by secret ballot DQGVKDOOFHUWLI\WKHUHVXOWVWKHUHRI´ HPSKDVLVDGGHG 
27. § 159(c)(1)(B).
28. Id.
29. § 158(a)(5).
30. § 159(c)(1)(B).
31. See Becker, supra note 24, at 515±18 (noting the difficulties with trying to
apply the political election process to the workplace environment).
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representative of its employees is an unfair labor practice.32 Section 8(a)(5)
has been used to establish a collective bargaining obligation where an
untainted secret ballot election is impossible and majority support can be
established on an alternative basis.33
IV. EVOLUTION OF BOARD PRACTICE
$IWHUWKH1/5$¶VSDVVDJHLQ, the NLRB initially allowed unions to
become certified based on a variety of evidence demonstrating majority
support.34 Due to political pressure, the Board shifted away from cardcheck and other evidence in favor of secret ballot elections,35 a move that
was codified in the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.36
The original language of the National Labor Relations Act allowed
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQWREHGHWHUPLQHGHLWKHUE\³DVHFUHWEDOORWRIHPSOR\HHV, or
[the use of] any other suitable method to ascertain [sic] such
UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV´37 7KH LQLWLDO %RDUG PHPEHUVKLS ORRNHG WR ³VLJQHG
authorization cards, membership applications, petitions, affidavits of
membership, signatures of employees receiving strike benefits from a
XQLRQSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDVWULNHFDOOHGE\DXQLRQDQGHPSOR\HHWHVWLPRQ\´
to resolve questions of representation.38
In 1939, the Board²under pressure from various actors on all sides of
the political spectrum²abandoned its practice of certifying unions without
a Board-supervised secret ballot election.39 The Taft-Hartley Act codified
32. § 158(a)(5).
33. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 579 (1969) (stating that a
union ma\ XVH DQ ³DOWHUQDWH URXWH WR PDMRULW\ VWDWXV´ ZKHQ ³D IDLU HOHFWLRQ >LV@ DQ
XQOLNHO\SRVVLELOLW\´GXHWRXQIDLUODERUSUDFWLFHVRQWKHSDUWRIWKHHPSOR\HU 
34. See Becker, supra note 24 DW  UHFRXQWLQJ WKDW RI WKH DYDLODEOH ³GLYHUVH
forms of evidenFH´ WKDW WKH %RDUG RULJLQDOO\ XVHG WR GHWHUPLQH ZKHQ D XQLRQ KDG
majority support, signed authorization cards were primarily relied upon).
35. See Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939) (endorsing secret
elections as the best way to effectuate the National Labor Relations Act). See also
Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078 (1966) (stating that secret elections are
³QRUPDOO\ D PRUH VDWLVIDFWRU\ PHDQV RI GHWHUPLQLQJ HPSOR\HHV¶ ZLVKHV´ DQG WKDW
HPSOR\HUV PD\ LQVLVW ³RQ HOHFWLRQ DV SURRI RI D XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\´ DV ORQJ DV WKH
HPSOR\HUKDVD³JRRG-IDLWKGRXEWRIWKHXQLRQ¶VPDMRULW\´ 
36. See Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9, Pub. L. No. 101, 61
Stat. 136, 144 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159 (2006)) (amending the
general language of Section 9 of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 to limit
certification to secret ballot elections).
37. See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449, 453
(1935) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-53, 157, 159±61, 163, 165-67 (2006)).
38. Becker, supra note 24, at 508.
39. See id. at 508±10 (lamenting that the first several years of the NLRB resulted in
universal criticism for the Board, including the President, Congress, the press,
employers, and unions). See, e.g., Cudahy Packing Co., 13 N.L.R.B. at 531±32
(endorsing the use of the secret ballot to select the representative union).

2011] CAN CARD-CHECK BE UNILATERALLY IMPOSED BY THE NLRB?

91

this restriction by changing the language of Section  F WRVD\³>L@Ia
question of representation exists, [the Board] shall direct an election by
VHFUHWEDOORWDQGVKDOOFHUWLI\WKHUHVXOWVWKHUHRI´40 In Aaron Bros., a case
decided by the Board in 1966, the Board held WKDWDQHPSOR\HU¶VUHIXVDOWR
bargain would not violate Section 8(a)(5) if the union had been selected in
the absence of an election.41 In 1969, the Supreme Court held, in NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., WKDW ³VHFUHW HOHFWLRQV DUH JHQHUDOO\ WKH PRVW
satisfactory²indeed the preferred²method of ascertaining whether a
XQLRQKDVPDMRULW\VXSSRUW´42
Specifically, in regard to authorization cards, the Board has an
inconsistent history.43 In 1949, the Board promulgated the Joy Silk
doctrine.44 ,QWKDWFDVHWKH%RDUGKHOGWKDWDQHPSOR\HU¶VJRRGIDLWKGRXEW
WKDW WKH XQLRQ¶V authorization cards did not adequately demonstrate its
majority status constituted a proper defense to a Section 8(5)(a) unfair labor
practice allegation.45 Good faith did not apply where, for example, other
unfair labor practices occurred or the employer failed to provide a reason
for her doubt.46
TKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXUURXQGLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGRXEWDUHYHU\LPSRUWDQW
For instance, in Aaron Bros., an employer that had no prior bargaining
relationship with the union was found not to be acting in bad faith when it
GHPDQGHG DQ HOHFWLRQ WR SURYH WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\; despite not offering
compelling reasons.47 In that case, the Board held that to find bad faith, the
40. § 159(c).
41. See $DURQ%URV1/5%   KROGLQJWKDWWKH(PSOR\HU¶V
refusal to bargain must also be in good faith and without other indicia of misconduct).
42. 395 U.S. 575, 602 (1969).
43. See id DW  ³>7R@ WUDFH WKH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH %RDUG¶V DSSURDFK WR
DXWKRUL]DWLRQFDUGVUHTXLUHVYLHZLQJWKH%RDUG¶VWUHDWPHQWRIDXWKRUL]DWLRQFDUGVLQ
three separate phases: (1) under the Joy Silk doctrine, (2) under the rules of the Aaron
Bros. FDVHDQG  XQGHUWKHDSSURDFKDQQRXQFHGDWRUDODUJXPHQWEHIRUHWKLV&RXUW´ 
44. See Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 N.L.R.B. 1263, 1264 (1949) (holding that an
emSOR\HU¶V EDG IDLWK LQVLVWHQFH RQ D %RDUG HOHFWLRQ DV SURRI RI WKH XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\
status and in conjunction with a refusal to bargain until such an election happens is a
violation of Section 8(a)(5)), enfd. as modified, 185 F.2d 732 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
45. See id. VWDWLQJ WKDW D YLRODWLRQ ZLOO RFFXU LI WKH HPSOR\HU LV PRWLYDWHG E\ ³D
rejection of the collective barraging principle or by desire to gain time within which to
XQGHUPLQH WKH XQLRQ´ LQWHUQDO TXRWDWLRQ PDUNV RPLWWHG  see also NLRB v. Gissel
PaFNLQJ &R  86     ³8QGHU >WKH Joy Silk doctrine], an employer
could lawfully refuse to bargain with a union claiming representative status through
SRVVHVVLRQ RI DXWKRUL]DWLRQ FDUGV LI KH KDG D µJRRG IDLWK GRXEW¶ DV WR WKH XQLRQ¶V
majorit\VWDWXV´ 
46. See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 592±93 (observing that the Joy Silk doctrine
did not apply where the employer committed independent unfair labor practices
indicative of bad faith).
47. See Aaron Bros., 158 N.L.R.B. 1077, 1078±80 (1966) KROGLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶V
LQDELOLW\ WR SURYH JRRG IDLWK GLG QRW VDWLVI\ WKH *HQHUDO &RXQVHO¶V EXUGHQ RI
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XQIDLUODERUSUDFWLFHPXVWKDYHEHHQ³FDOFXODWHGWRGLVVLSDWHXQLRQVXSSRUW´
among workers.48 The Board elaborated that a failure to state a reason
when questioning a majority status is not evidence of bad faith, unless the
facts and circumstances of the case support that conclusion.49
In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., several unions filed unfair labor practice
charges against employers although, in some cases, secret ballot elections
had not taken place.50 The unions argued that employers had violated
Section 8(a)(5) when a majority of employees, in an appropriate unit,
signed authorization cards and the employers had committed other unfair
labor practices that eliminated the possibility of a fair secret ballot
election.51 The employers argued that their refusal to bargain was
legitimate, because the authorization cards did not settle the question of
representation.52 The NLRB issued bargaining orders and reasoned that the
authorization cards were sufficient to establish that a majority of employees
in the bargaining unit supported the union as their representative and that
the employers had ulterior motives rather than good faith doubt in regard to
WKHXQLRQ¶V majority status.53 Additionally, the NLRB determined that the
employers had committed unfair labor practices in violation of Sections
8(a)(1) and (3).54 7KH )RXUWK &LUFXLW KRZHYHU UHYHUVHG WKH %RDUG¶V
decision and bargaining orders with respect to the Section 8(a)(5) claim,
EXW XSKHOG WKH %RDUG¶V GHFLVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
claims.55 7KH )LUVW &LUFXLW XSKHOG WKH %RDUG¶V interpretation of Section
GHPRQVWUDWLQJWKHHPSOR\HU¶VEDGIDLWK 
48. Id. at 1079.
49. See id. at 1079 (³:KHWKHU DQ HPSOR\HU LV DFWLQJ LQ JRRG RU EDG IDLWK LQ
questioning the union's majority is a determination which of necessity must be made in
the light of all the relevant facts of the case, including any unlawful conduct of the
employer, the sequence of events, and the time lapse between the refusal and the
unlawfuOFRQGXFW´ ; see also Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 593 (noting that after Aaron
Bros ³DQ HPSOR\HU QR ORQJHU QHHGHG WR FRPH IRUZDUG ZLWK UHDVRQV IRU UHMHFWLQJ D
EDUJDLQLQJGHPDQG´ .
50. See 395 U.S. at 580 (recounting the various allegations of coercion and
intimidation that the employers utilized against the unions and their supporters).
51. See id. at 580±82 (observing that elections, subsequent to the signed
authorization cards and the alleged unfair labor practices, either never occurred or
resulted in victory for the employers).
52. Id. at 580.
53. See id. at 582± GLVFXVVLQJ WKH %RDUG¶V XVH RI HPSOR\HUV¶ ³GHVLUH WR JDLQ
WLPH WR GLVVLSDWH WKH >XQLRQ¶V PDMRULW\@ VWDWXV    >LQ RUGHU WR ZDJH@ WKHLU DQWLXQLRQ
FDPSDLJQHIIRUWV´DVHYLGHQFHRIWKeir violation of Section 8(a)(5)).
54. See id. PHQWLRQLQJ WKH %RDUG¶V ILQGLQJV WKDW WKH HPSOR\HUV¶ KDG HQJDJHG LQ
unlawful interrogations, surveillance, promised benefits, and terminations of unionsupporting employees).
55. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336, 337 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam)
UHY¶GLQSDUWDII¶GLQSDUW86  1/5%Y+HFN¶V,QF)G
338±39 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) UHY¶G LQ SDUW DII¶G LQ SDUW VXE QRP NLRB v.
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8(a)(5) and fully enforced the bargaining order56²creating a circuit split.57
In order to resolve the issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to all
four cDVHVDQGXOWLPDWHO\XSKHOGWKH%RDUG¶VEDUJDLQLQJRUGHUV58
At oral argument before the Supreme Court in Gissel, the Board
abandoned the good faith standard and instead relied upon the existence of
other unfair labor practices to establish an Section 8(a)(5) violation.59 The
6XSUHPH &RXUW VXPPDUL]HG WKH %RDUG¶V QHZ SROLF\ LQ WKH IROORZLQJ
PDQQHU³DQHPSOR\HUFDQLQVLVWWKDWDXQLRQJRWRDQHOHFWLRn, regardless
of his subjective motivation, so long as he is not guilty of misconduct; he
need give no affirmative reasons for rejecting a recognition request, and he
FDQ GHPDQG DQ HOHFWLRQ ZLWK D VLPSOH µQR FRPPHQW¶ WR WKH XQLRQ´60
However, the Court addeG³WKDWDQHPSOR\HUFRXOGQRWUHIXVHWREDUJDLQLI
he knew, through a personal poll for instance, that a majority of his
HPSOR\HHV VXSSRUWHG WKH XQLRQ´61 Because the employers had committed
unfair labor practices that prevented a fair election, the Supreme Court
QRWHGWKDWWKHLUGHFLVLRQGLGQRWDGGUHVV³ZKHWKHUDEDUJDLQLQJRUGHULVHYHU
appropriate in cases where there is no interference with the election
processes´62 Thus, WKH VFRSH RI WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ LQ Gissel Packing
does not include cases where a union collects authorization cards from a
majority of employees without employer interference.
The NLRB and the Supreme Court addressed that question in Linden
Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB in 1974.63 In Linden Lumber, the
union had obtained authorization cards from a majority of employees, but
the employer refused to recognize the union.64 The union filed for an
election pursuant to Section 9(c), to which the employer stated that it would
refuse to abide by the result. This prompted the union to withdraw its
petition. Linden argued that two of the employees were actually

Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969); Gen. Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d
339, 340 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam) UHY¶G LQ SDUW DII¶G LQ SDUW VXE QRP NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
56. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 161±62 (1st Cir. 1968), DII¶G VXE QRP
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
57. See id. at 585, 589± UHFRXQWLQJ WKH FRQIOLFWLQJ RSLQLRQV RQ WKH 1/5%¶V
interpretation of Section 8(a)(5) in the First and Fourth Circuits).
58. See Gissel Packing, 395 U.S. at 579.
59. Id. at 594.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 595.
63. See 419 U.S. 301, 302 (1974) (couching that the question presented in Linden
Lumber ZDV SUHFLVHO\ WKH TXHVWLRQ WKH &RXUW KDG ³H[SUHVVO\ UHVHUYHG´ LQ Gissel
Packing).
64. Id.
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supervisors, and their participation in organizing a recognitional strike had
compromised the reliability of the authorization cards. The only unfair
labor practice that Linden was charged with was failing to bargain with the
HPSOR\HHV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYH²in violation of Section 8(a)(5).65 The Board
KHOG WKDW /LQGHQ¶V ³UHIXVDO WR DFFHSW HYLGHQFH RI PDMRULW\ VXSSRUW RWKHU
WKDQ WKH UHVXOWV RI D %RDUG HOHFWLRQ´ GLG QRW FRQVWLWXWH DQ XQIDLU ODbor
practice,66 and the Supreme Court subsequently upheld this policy as a
SURSHUXVHRIWKH%RDUG¶VSRZHUWRLQWHUSUHWWKH1/5$67
Since Linden Lumber WKH %RDUG KDV LQWHUSUHWHG WKH ³TXHVWLRQ RI
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ EURDGO\ HQFRPSDVVLQJ YLUWXDOO\ DOOVLWXDWLRQs in which an
employer denies a demand for recognition.68 It is so broad that Board
policy essentially always calls for an election as a prerequisite for
recognition, unless the employer recognizes the union voluntarily or
commits an unfair labor practice that would taint any election results.69 The
6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV XSKHOG WKLV SROLF\ DV D SURSHU XVH RI WKH %RDUG¶V
discretion.70
V. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
The NLRB is composed of five members, appointed by the President and
charged with the administration of the NLRA.71 Typically, the Board
announces rules through adjudication rather than rulemaking. 72 As such, if
the Board is presented with an ideal set of facts for it to re-examine the

65. Id.
66. Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 721 (1971), enf.
denied sub nom. Truck Drivers Local No. 413 v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir.
1973), UHY¶G VXE QRP Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S.
301 (1974).
67. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309±10 (holdiQJWKDWWKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQZDV
QHLWKHU³DUELWUDU\DQGFDSULFLRXVRUDQDEXVHRIGLVFUHWLRQ 
68. See id. at 310 (placing the burden on unions to follow through with their
election petitions before the NLRB prior to claiming authorization cards to resolve
questions of representation).
69. See OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, NLRB, BASIC GUIDE TO THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS ACT: GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW UNDER THE STATUTE AND
PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 9 (1997).
70. See, e.g., John Cueno, Inc. v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 1178, 1183 (1983) (applying
Linden Lumber to require a union to demonstrate majority status through an NLRB
certified election).
71. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (2006).
72. Cf. Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB in Administrative
Law Exile: Problems with its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58
DUKE L.J. 2013, 2017   ³7KHIDFWWKDWWKH1/5%HVFKHZVQRWLFH-and-comment
rulemaking makes it immune to the frequent post-Administrative Procedure Act waves
of regulatory reform that have focused on the rationalization and coordination of
LQIRUPDOUXOHPDNLQJ´ 
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question, it can announce a new rule via adjudication.73 To present an
opportunity to change the current rule, a dispute must arise from an
HPSOR\HU¶VUHIXVDOWRHQWHUFROOHFWLYHEDUJDLQLQJZLWKDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHWKDW
has demonstrated, through signed authorization cards, that a majority of
employees within an appropriate bargaining unit have requested
representation. The representative would have to file an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer for violating Section 8(a)(5).74 Then,
the Board could rule on the question of what is required to show that a
union has been selected as the representative under Section 8(a)(5).
The Board could then announce a new interpretation of Section
8(a)(5)²WKDW WKH VWDWXV RI ³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ FDQ EH DFKLHYHG WKURXJK
collecting signed authorization cards from a majority of employees in an
appropriate bargaining unit, even if there are no other allegations of unfair
labor practices and a fair election would be possible. In doing so, the
NLRB could change the policy of ILQGLQJ D ³TXHVWLRQ RI UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´
under Section 9(c) wherever the employer disputes such representation, and
implement a more restrictive approach that would require the employer to
show cause WRTXHVWLRQWKHXQLRQ¶VPDMRULW\VWDWXV²an allegation that the
cards were invalid because they were collected over too long of a time
period or some evidence of fraud²rather than just the absence of an
election. Representation could exist where a union has demonstrated that a
majority of employees have signed union cards, and the union could avoid
a secret ballot election.
An employer would probably appeal such a sweeping change in Board
policy.75 Upon ultimate review, the Supreme Court might uphold the policy
FKDQJH DV D YDOLG H[HUFLVH RI WKH %RDUG¶V DGMXGLFDWLYH UXOHPDNLQJ
authority. The only insurmountable legal restraints on the BoaUG¶V
rulemaking authority are embodied in statutes enacted by Congress and
from rulings of the Supreme Court.76 Indeed, the traditionally preferred
method of rulemaking by the Board²rules made through adjudication²
73. See, e.g., Toering Elec. Co., 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 225±25 (2007) (changing the
%RDUG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQ³VDOWLQJFDPSDLJQ´6HFWLRQ D   GLVFKDUJHFDVHV²when a
XQLRQ SODQWV D XQLRQ RUJDQL]HU DV DQ HPSOR\HH DW DQ HPSOR\HU¶V ZRUNSODFH WR VSXU
union support²WR UHTXLUH WKH *HQHUDO &RXQVHO WR SURYH WKH ³VDOWV´ KDYH D ³JHQXLQH
LQWHUHVWLQVHFXULQJHPSOR\PHQW´ 
74. 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(5) (2006).
75. See  86&   I    SURYLGLQJ WKDW ³>D@Q\ SHUVRQ DJJULHYHG E\ D
final order of the Board . . . may obtain a review of such order in any Unites States
court of appeals in the circuit [where personal jurisdiction exists over a party] . . . or, in
WKH8QLWHV6WDWHV&RXUWRI$SSHDOVIRUWKH'LVWULFWRI&ROXPELD´ 
76. Cf. Michael C. Harper, -XGLFLDO&RQWURORIWKH1/5%¶V/DZPDNLQJLQWKH$JH
of Chevron and Brand X, 80 B.U. L. REV. 189, 191±92 (2009) (arguing that courts can
UHJXODWH WKH %RDUG¶V IUHTXHQWO\ VKLIWLQJ SUHFHGHQWV HYHQ RXWVLGH WKH %RDUG XVLQJ LWV
rulemaking power).
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are rightly subject to challenge in subsequent adjudications²even if the
rules are of general applicability.77 On the other hand, because the Board
has complete turnover every five years and it is not required to rely on
principles of stare decisis, it is often criticized for the uncertainty
surrounding the policies that it promulgates.78 The next section will discuss
whether such a policy change should survive judicial review.
A. Argument to Uphold Card-Check Unilaterally Imposed by the NLRB
Under Chevron, judicial review of agency decision-making is a two-step
process.79 First, the Court must ask whether the statute in question has a
clear meaning.80 If the relevant statute is ambiguous, then step two requires
WKDW WKH &RXUW GHWHUPLQH ZKHWKHU WKH DJHQF\¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ LV
reasonable.81 From the current language of Section 9(c), there is no
ambiguity under Chevron step one as to whether a secret ballot is necessary
to certify a bargaining representative ZKHQ WKHUH LV ³D TXHVWLRQ RI
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´.82 +RZHYHULWLVZHOOZLWKLQWKH%RDUG¶VSRZHUWRLQWHUSret
ambiguous provisions of the Act either broadly or narrowly.83 Therefore,
what constitutes a question of representation may be validly subject to the
Board¶V interpretation under Chevron step one because the NLRA is
ambiguous as to what constitutes a question of representation.84 In Linden
77. See Claire Tuck, Note, Policy Formulation at the NLRB: A Viable Alternative
to Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2005) (noting
WKDW %RDUG ZLOO XVXDOO\ RYHUWXUQ LWV PRUH ³FRQWURYHUVLDO GHFLVLRQV DIWHU D FKDQJH LQ D
SUHVLGHQWLDODGPLQLVWUDWLRQ´ 
78. See id. at 1118, 1120 (observing that both employers and unions are sometimes
reluctant to comply with Board decisions if the decision is controversial and may be
overturn by a later Board).
79. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
80. See id. at 842± RXWOLQLQJ WKDW WKH ³TXHVWLRQ >LV@ ZKHWKHU &RQJUHVV KDV
direFWO\VSRNHQWRWKHSUHFLVHLVVXH´ 
81. See id. at 843 (holding that a reviewing court must not supplant its own
statutory construction, but²DVVXPLQJ WKH VWDWXWRU\ ODQJXDJH LV HLWKHU ³VLOHQW RU
DPELJXRXV´²PXVWH[DPLQHZKHWKHUWKHDJHQF\¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQLV ³SHUPLVVLEOH´ 
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B) (2006).
83. See, e.g. 1/5% Y +HDUVW 3XEO¶QV ,QF  86   ±32 (1944)
XSKROGLQJ WKDW WKH %RDUG¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI ³HPSOR\HH´ WR FRYHU D ZLGH UDQJH RI
workers to help effectuate the policies of the NLRA), superseded by statute, Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 137 (1947), as
recognized in NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254 (1968); see also Jamison
F. Grella, Comment, From Corporate Express to FedEx Home Delivery: A New Hurdle
for Employees Seeking the Protections of the National Labor Relations Act in the D.C.
Circuit, 18 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL¶Y & Law 877, 901±02 (2010) (arguing that
courts should give the NLRB the most deference when it is interpreting the scope of the
NLRA).
84. See  F  %  VWDWLQJ WKDW ³LI WKH %RDUG ILQGV XSRQ WKH UHFRUG >WKDW D@
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall
FHUWLI\WKHUHVXOWVWKHUHRI´ 
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Lumber, the Supreme Court did not determine that the Gissel Packing
approach²requiring an election in the absence of voluntary recognition or
substantial unfair labor practices²was the only acceptable approach.85
Rather, Justice Douglas explained,
In light of the statutory scheme [of the NLRA] and the practical
administrative procedural questions involved, we cannot say that
WKH%RDUG¶VGHFLVLRQWKDWWKHXQLRQVKRXOGJRIRUZDUGDQGDVNIRU
DQ HOHFWLRQ RQ WKH HPSOR\HU¶V UHfusal to recognize the
authorization cards was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion.86
This decision occurred before Chevron, but the Court understood its role
was not to mandate an interpretation, but to oversee the process used to
reach that interpretation.87
Having satisfied the first step, the next question is whether a narrower
interpretation would be reasonable under Chevron step two.88 A narrow
construction of what constitutes a question of representation neither need
be confined within the statutory language, nor would it be arbitrary and
capricious.89 The current policy is very broad, and allows an employer to
question representation without cause.90 It need not be so extreme²indeed,
a policy limiting the reach of this provision to situations in which there is a
legitimate question of representation may be more reasonable than its
predecessor. By limiting the application of Section 9(c), Section 8(a)(5)
would apply only when QR ³TXHVWLRQ RIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´ H[LVWV7KH VFRSH
of Section 8(a  LVQRWOLPLWHGWRD³FHUWLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´²unions can
obtain the status as the representative independent of their certification
through secret ballot election.91 Congress easily could have changed the
ODQJXDJHIURP³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´WR³FHUWLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´KDGLWGHVLUHGD

85. See Linden Lumber Division, Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301, 309±10
  H[SODLQLQJWKHVWDQGDUGRIUHYLHZIRUWKH1/5%¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH$FWLV
ZKHWKHU WKH %RDUG¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ ZDV HLWKHU DUELWUDU\ DQG FDSULFLRXV RU DQ DEXVHRI
discretion²not a search for the best policy).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 310.
88. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
89. See, e.g., INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144±46 (1981) (holding that the
&RXUW RI $SSHDOV KDG ³LPSURYLGHQWly encroached on the authority which the
[Immigration and Nationality] Act confers on the Attorney General . . . [to determine]
ZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVµH[WUHPHKDUGVKLS¶´XQGHU86&§ 1254(a)(1)).
90. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 310.
91. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 599±600 (1969) (declaring that
Section 9(c)(1)(B) does nothing to relieve the bargaining obligation on employers
XQGHU 6HFWLRQ  D   RI WKH $FW ZKHQ WKH HPSOR\HU KDV ³HQJDJHG LQ XQIDLU ODERU
practices disruptive of the Board¶VHOHFWLRQPDFKLQHU\´ 
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contrary result. Section 8(a)(5) stands on its own as an unfair labor
practice, and nothing in the statutory context implies that it must be
accompanied by another unfair labor practice for an uncertified, but
majority-supported, union to invoke it.92 Thus, it is permissible to define
these labels²³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´ DQG ³FHUWLILHG UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´²differently,
enabling unions to establish representative status through card-check rather
than secret ballot elections. Card-check is already a legitimate means to
establish majority support where the employer consents, and if the NLRA
extended that to situations where the employer does not raise a legitimate
³TXHVWLRQRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´LWLVOLNHO\WKDWFRXUWVZRXOGILQGWKDWUXOHWo
be a reasonable interpretation of the NLRA.
B. Argument to Reverse Card-Check Unilaterally Imposed by the NLRB
Proponents of reversal could first argue that the statute is not ambiguous
under step one of Chevron.93 If a statute is not ambiguous, and the Supreme
&RXUW KDV DIILUPHG DQ DJHQF\¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ WKHQ WKHUH LV QR URRP IRU
agency discretion in changing the rule.94 Since the Supreme Court has
already ruled on Section 8(a)(5)¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ²specifically where
unions, supported by authorization cards where no other unfair labor
practices occurred that prevent a fair election, cannot claim there is a
Section 8(a)(5) bargaining obligation²the Board¶VDELOLW\WRFKDQJHFRXUVH
is curtailed.95
If the Court, however, finds that the statute is ambiguous, then it will
proceed to step two of Chevron.96 Here, opponents can argue that the
proposed new interpretation is unreasonable in light of congressional
intent. For instance, they could argue that the Taft-Hartley amendments to
the NLRA intentionally excluded the card-check as a means to become a
³FHUWLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLYH´7KHWH[WRIWKHVWDWXWHSULRUWRLWVDPHQGPHQWE\
the Taft-+DUWOH\ $FW DOORZHG ³WKH 1/5% WR UHVROYH TXHVWLRQV RI
representation either WKURXJKDµVHFUHWEDOORWRIWKHHPSOR\HHV¶or through
µDQ\ RWKHUVXLWDEOH PHWKRG WR DVFHUWDLQ>VLF@ VXFK UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV¶´97 The
92. See id. at 597±98 (stating that unions may establish their majority status, for
SXUSRVHV RI 6HFWLRQ  D   WKURXJK HLWKHU ³XQLRQ-called strike or a strike vote[,]´ in
addition to possession of authorization cards).
93. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842±43.
94. See id. at 843 Q ³7KH MXGLFLDU\ LV WKH ILQDO DXWKRULW\ RQ LVVXHV RI VWDWXWRU\
construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
FRQJUHVVLRQDOLQWHQW´ 
95. See Linden Lumber, 419 U.S. at 309±10.
96. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842±43.
97. See Becker, supra note 24, at 505±06 & n.39 (alteration in original) (quoting
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act § 9(c), Pub. L. No. 198, 29 Stat. 449, 453
(1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 9(c) (2006))).
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Taft-Hartley Act amended this language and omitted the language
permitting other suitable methods in favor of secret ballot elections.98 In
light of the statutory revisions, no permissible interpretation of the statute
allows using authorization cards to determine a question of representation.
The fact that a representative is not certified or voluntarily recognized is
sufficient to raise a question of representation, and it would be counter to
congressional intent if the Board promulgated such a rule through a back
channel²such as adjudication.
&RQJUHVV¶ GHFLVLRQ WR QRW FKDQJH WKH ODQJXDJH LQ Section 8(a)(5) from
³UHSUHVHQWDWLYH´WRDUHSUHVHQWDWLYH³FXUUHQWO\UHFRJQL]HGE\WKHHPployer
or certified as such [(through an election)] under [Section 9(a)]´99 was
intended to extend protection to representatives whose majority support
could not be determined in a fair election as a result of unfair labor
practices.100 It was not meant to provide to unions²where the only proof
of their majority support is authorization cards signed by employees²the
statutory right to bargain with employers mandated by Section 8(a)(5).
VI. CONCLUSION
Both sides have strong legal arguments in their favor. As a legal matter,
if the NLRB maneuvered the card-check method into the regulatory
scheme regulating labor relations, that decision would likely survive
judicial review. Congress intended that the NLRB determine what raises a
question of representation, who is WKH HPSOR\HHV¶ FKRVHQ representative,
and how majority support can be demonstrated where no question of
representation exists.101 The NLRB is supposed to interpret the Act,
including Sections 8(a)(5) and 9(c), even if the issue has previously been
decided.102 Allowing the card-check method to suffice as evidence that an
employer has an obligation to enter into collective bargaining is a
reasonable reading of Section 8(a)(5), and limiting the scope of questions
of representation that have legitimate bases in fact is a reasonable reading
of Section 9(c).
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2006).
See H.R. 3020, at 21 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31, 51 (1959, 1985 prtg.)
(emphasis added). But cf. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(a)(5),
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136, 141 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5) (2006)) (stating, for purposes of Section 8(a)(5), that employers must bargain
ZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHV³VXEMHFWWRWKHSURYLVLRQVRIVHFWLRQ D RIWKLVWLWOH´ 
100. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co, 395 U.S. 575, 599±600 (1969).
101. § 159(c)(1)(B).
102. See § 156 (giving the Board the power to engage in any rule or decisionmaking activities permitted by the Administrative Procedures Act in order to effectuate
the NLRA).
98.
99.
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While legally sound, such a policy shift may have too many political
costs and long-run negative implications for the Board and the labor
movement. These implications may be far-reaching. For one, the debate
over the EFCA has been abandoned, thus preventing card-check from
EHFRPLQJ SDUW RI WKH %RDUG¶V VWDWXWRU\ IUDPHZRUN DQG VXEMHFW WR WKH
whims of subsequent Boards. Additionally, if commentators who opposed
%HFNHU¶VQRPLQDWLRQRXWRIIHDUWKDWFDUG-check would be approved by the
%RDUGDUHDEOHWRVD\³,WROG\RXVR´WKHQIXWXUHDSSRLQWHHVWRWKH%RDUG
may have an even more difficult and prolonged confirmation process than
Becker, who was ultimately given a recess appointment. Memories of a
short-lived card-check measure may compel a future more-conservative
&RQJUHVVWRSDVVOHJLVODWLRQIXUWKHUUHVWULFWLQJWKH%RDUG¶VGLVFUHWLRQ7KH
Board should not pursue this measure through the administrative process
despite their legal ability to do so, because the long-term outcome may be
less desirable than the status quo.

